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democracies last longer. This gives governments in unstable democracies an extra motive to 
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of worldwide democratization since the late 1980s. 
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“Striking down trade barriers is critical to sustaining democracy […] throughout the region.” 
[Former U.S. President George W. Bush at the 2001 summit of the potential signatories of the Free Trade Area 
of the Americas (New York Times, 4/18/2001)] 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
When the United States formally announced the intention to pursue a free trade agreement 
with Central America countries, there were three explicit goals, one of which was “to support 
democracy in the region” (www.whitehouse.gov, 16 January, 2002).  Indeed, the establishment of 
new democracies has often been followed by the formation of preferential arrangements (or the 
accession to existing ones). This was the case, for example, of all Mercosur members, of Greece, 
Portugal and Spain in their accessions to the European Community, and of the EU agreements with 
Central and Eastern Europe countries shortly after the fall of the iron curtain. It is therefore not too 
surprising that governments regularly report to the World Trade Organization that “promoting 
democracy and political stability” is a central force behind their decisions to form regional trade 
agreements (World Trade Organization 2011). Of course, this may be mere rhetoric. But maybe not. 
In this paper we develop a coherent theoretical mechanism for the link between participation 
in free trade agreements (FTAs) and democratic consolidation. We then scrutinize it empirically. 
Specifically, we argue that participation in FTAs can serve as a commitment device to destroy future 
protectionist rents. Since such rents are attractive to autocratic groups, FTAs lower their incentives 
to seek power. While this may have little value for established democracies, where the rule of law is 
strong and the risk of authoritarian disruption is negligible, it matters for unstable democracies. 
Some states will therefore have an extra incentive to seek involvement in FTAs, over and above the 
agreements’ potential trade gains. 
We provide the theoretical basis for our claims by extending the preferential trade 
integration model developed by Ornelas (2005a) to allow for endogenous changes in the political 
regime.1 In that otherwise standard model, under any trade regime domestic firms exchange 
transfers for protection with the government, which cares about national welfare and the transfers it 
receives. The government then decides whether to form an FTA considering the political economy 
equilibrium under each trade regime. The key to understand the impact of an FTA is the recognition 
that the equilibrium of the (ex post) external tariff game changes under the constraint imposed by the 
agreement on the internal tariffs. Once one takes this into account, and only then, one finds that even 
                                                          
1 To our knowledge, McLaren (2000) provides the only other theoretical analysis of how political turnover 
affects governments’ decisions to participate in trade agreements. However, his emphasis is very different, on the 
choice between free trade areas and customs unions. 
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though FTAs still permit lobbying for protection against excluded countries, the volume of 
protectionist rents falls with the formation of an agreement. 
 In a dynamic setting this implies that, all else equal, groups motivated mainly by rents will 
have lower incentives to seek power if the country is deeply engaged in FTAs and withdrawal from 
the agreement is costly. Authoritarian groups tend to fit this description well, given their aptitude to 
resort to violence rather than to rely on accountability to keep power.2 If the gain of authoritarian 
groups from seeking power falls when the country is engaged in FTAs, but the agreement does not 
alter the costs and risks from attempting a coup d’état, the likelihood of democratic failure will, all 
else being equal, be lower if the country is more intensively involved in FTAs. Hence, greater 
participation in FTAs increases the likelihood of democracy survival. 
 If the incumbent government in an unstable democracy realizes this effect of “democratic 
consolidation,” it will seek participation in FTAs more actively than it otherwise would, in order to 
weaken the authoritarian threat. Yet even if the dictatorial group takes control despite the FTA, the 
agreement would still constrain its rent-extraction activities. For both of these reasons, unstable 
democracies tend to enter in FTAs more frequently than stable ones. 
 Analyzing the formation of FTAs and the strength of democracy in 116 countries over 1960-
2007, we obtain empirical support for both of our main theoretical results. Employing duration 
analysis techniques, we find that greater participation in FTAs lowers the likelihood of democracy 
failure in a country. Using the estimated hazard rates from the duration analysis, but considering 
only the portion of the likelihood that is not predicted by current FTA participation, we find as well 
that a higher risk of democratic breakdown induces countries to participate more actively in FTAs. 
Our empirical results are robust to many different econometric specifications, alternative measures 
of democratic transition and different sets of controls. 
One of our empirical challenges is to define how unstable a democracy is. We do so by 
relying on the approach proposed by Persson and Tabellini (2009), who estimate the likelihood of 
democracy failure employing the concept of “democratic capital.” The domestic component of 
democratic capital takes into account the history of democracy in the country. The longer the 
country has experienced democracy, and the more recent is its democratic experience, the greater 
the country’s stock of domestic democratic capital. The foreign component of democratic capital 
encompasses instead current levels of democracy abroad. The greater the number of democratic 
                                                          
2 In our analysis we do not take a stance on whether democratic or authoritarian regimes are more rent-
seeking. We nevertheless note that, at least in the trade context, authoritarian regimes are often associated with 
greater restrictions (see e.g. Aidt and Gassebner 2010, Mansfield et al. 2000 and Mitra et al. 2002). 
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countries, and the closer those democracies are to a country, the greater is that country’s stock of 
foreign democratic capital. Along with other covariates, these two components of democratic capital 
allow us to estimate the likelihood of democracy failure in a country. We find that greater 
participation in FTAs reduces this probability. 
Our estimates are statistically significant and also economically meaningful. Figure 1 
illustrates this. It plots, for several countries, the estimated hazard against the share of imports that 
stem from FTA partners.3 As the figure clearly shows, the hazard out of democracy drops sharply 
right after those countries become significantly engaged in FTAs. 
 
Figure 1: Hazard out of democracy and share of imports from FTA partners, selected countries 
0
0 0
0
0 00
0
0
0
00 0000 000 0000 00
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
FT
A_
im
ps
h
0
.0
05
.0
1
.0
15
H
az
ar
d
1980 1990 2000 2010
year
Argentina
0
0
0 0 0
0
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
FT
A_
im
ps
h
0
.0
1
.0
2
.0
3
.0
4
H
az
ar
d
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
year
Brazil
0
0
0
0
0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 .3
5
.4
.4
5
.5
.5
5
FT
A_
im
ps
h
.0
12
.0
14
.0
16
.0
18
.0
2
H
az
ar
d
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
year
Paraguay
000
0
0
000000000
0
0
0
000000000000000 0
.2
.4
.6
.8
FT
A_
im
ps
h
0
.0
1
.0
2
.0
3
.0
4
H
az
ar
d
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year
Greece
00
0
0
0
00
00000000
0
0
0000000000000000 0
.2
.4
.6
.8
FT
A_
im
ps
h
0
.0
1
.0
2
.0
3
.0
4
.0
5
H
az
ar
d
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year
Portugal
0
0
00
00000000
0
0
0000000000000000 0
.2
.4
.6
.8
FT
A_
im
ps
h
0
.0
1
.0
2
.0
3
.0
4
H
az
ar
d
1980 1990 2000 2010
year
Spain
0
0
0
0
0 0
0 0 0
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
FT
A_
im
ps
h
.0
1
.0
2
.0
3
.0
4
.0
5
H
az
ar
d
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
year
Bulgaria
0
0
0
0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
.2
.4
.6
.8
FT
A_
im
ps
h
.0
1
.0
15
.0
2
.0
25
.0
3
.0
35
H
az
ar
d
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
year
Poland
0
0
0
0 0
0
0 0
0
0
0 0 0
0
0 0 0
.2
.4
.6
.8
FT
A_
im
ps
h
.0
15
.0
2
.0
25
.0
3
.0
35
H
az
ar
d
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
year
Romania
                                             x: FTA_impsh (right Y-axis); 0: Hazard (left Y-axis)
 
Notes: “FTA_impsh” denotes the share of the country’s imports that originates from FTA partners. “Hazard” is the 
hazard out of democracy, estimated as explained in section 4. 
 
A concern is that FTA participation may be endogenous in the estimation of democracy 
                                                          
3 It is worth noting that the relationship is not driven by the countries illustrated in Figure 1; in fact, we 
show that our finding holds well even after we drop Mercosur and Eastern European countries from the analysis. 
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longevity. Indeed, our second hypothesis implies a positive relationship between democracy 
instability and formation of new FTAs. From this view the endogeneity bias would imply a positive 
relationship between FTA participation and democracy instability, suggesting that the negative 
relationship we obtain is a lower bound (in absolute value) for the true effect. We nevertheless 
investigate further this issue and propose an instrumental variable estimation that relies on 
“contagion” effects in FTA formation that follows a reasoning advanced by Egger and Larch (2008) 
and Baldwin and Jaimovich (2012). The main idea is that, when its neighbors engage more deeply in 
FTAs, a country would tend to follow suit. We confirm that contagion measures are indeed strong 
instruments for FTA participation. Moreover, our finding that more intense FTA participation 
increases the longevity of democracies is not altered when we use this approach. 
 Interestingly, our predictions hold consistently only for full-fledged agreements, signed 
under GATT’s Article XXIV. Article XXIV requires free trade agreements to cover most of the trade 
among the members and that members liberalize fully vis-à-vis each other. By contrast, agreements 
signed under the Enabling Clause of the GATT permit many exceptions and are often not fully 
implemented.4 We do not find any significant association between those partial-scope preferential 
trade agreements (as well as those signed but not reported to the WTO) and democracy survival, or 
between political instability and the formation of partial-scope agreements. These stark differential 
results are consistent with the rent-destructing mechanism we put forward, as the partial-scope 
arrangements, unlike those signed under Article XXIV, impose very few restrictions on the 
availability of rents from protection. 
To our knowledge, Pevehouse (2005) is the only other to relate participation in trade 
agreements—in fact, participation in international organizations broadly defined—to the durability 
of democracy. He argues that joining (although not the participation itself) an international 
organization tends to increase the longevity of new democracies, mostly because of signaling effects, 
and provided that the international organization has high “democratic density.” Following 
Pevehouse, we also test whether FTAs help to sustain democracies only when the arrangements are 
composed mostly of highly democratic members. We find that the role of an FTA in helping to 
sustain a country’s democracy is not greater when the agreement is with more democratic partners. 
Thus, pressure from more democratic FTA partners is not what drives our results. 
 Our second finding is also novel, but relates to other previous results. Mansfield, Milner and 
Rosendorff (2002) find that pairs of democratic countries are more likely to share a trade agreement 
                                                          
4 This relates to the findings of Mrazova et al. (2012), who show that Article XXIV can have important 
welfare implications. 
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than pairs in which at least one country has an authoritarian political regime.5 We take the Mansfield 
et al.’s finding on board and focus on democracies. We then dig deeper to understand whether 
democracies at different stages in their “consolidation” process have different incentives to engage 
in FTAs. We find that they do: among democracies, those who face threats to their democratic 
regimes are especially prone to form FTAs.  
Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006), like us, distinguish between different types of democracies 
and their willingness to join international organizations. Specifically, they find that countries that 
have undergone a transition to democracy in the previous five years are more likely to join 
international organizations, in particular those made up of more democratic states. Two central 
differences between the findings of Mansfield and Pevehouse and our second main result are worth 
emphasizing. First, we explicitly estimate each country’s hazard out of democracy (rather than 
splitting democracies between new and old ones). Second, we do not pool all types of international 
organizations together. This difference matters, as we find a strong effect of democratic instability on 
FTA participation but not on participation in partial-scope trade agreements. 
These (and other) differential effects do not prove, but are all consistent with the idea that 
engagement in FTAs helps democracies to endure because of their rent destruction effects. Our 
novel measure of FTA participation further reinforces the view that the destruction of rents is an 
essential element behind the result. Rather than using dummies to indicate participation in FTAs, we 
use the share of a country’s imports that come from its FTAs partners. As we argue in section 4, this 
continuous measure of FTA participation is far superior to the common practice of using dummies. 
Furthermore, it is supported by the model, where we show that our measure is negatively correlated 
with the volume of available protectionist rents under FTAs. 
The essence of our argument is related to the commitment rationale for trade agreements 
espoused by Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998, 2007), although in their analyses a government 
enters a free trade agreement not to affect its successor’s policies, but its own (otherwise time-
inconsistent) future policies. The more general idea that governments can manipulate state variables 
to constrain their successors’ choices was first advanced in the macroeconomics political economy 
literature.6 More recently, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) have developed a general framework to 
study circumstances when an incumbent democratic government can design economic policies to 
                                                          
5 Mansfield, Milner and Pevehouse (2008) find that this holds for different types of trade agreements except 
the “shallowest” ones, according to a five-tier classification. Roy (2011) takes a distinct perspective, showing that the 
breadth of the service commitments undertaken by WTO members is greater for more democratic countries. 
6 See e.g. the pioneering contributions by Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and Persson and Svensson (1989). 
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irreversibly change the expected net benefit of future coups.7 A related reasoning is employed here 
to show that a democratic government, when faced with the prospect of political disruption, may 
want to limit the ability of a potential authoritarian government to create rents through trade 
policies. We innovate in this dimension by showing, theoretically and empirically, that an FTA can 
be an effective tool for that purpose.8 
 There is also an important line of research that links democracy to trade liberalization and 
openness.9 The forces typically emphasized in that literature are however quite different from the 
mechanism we advance here. Moreover, and critically, in this paper we focus on the role of trade 
agreements, where an external commitment makes the policy costly enough to reverse so that it can 
credibly affect the actions of future governments.10 A unilateral tariff reduction would clearly not 
fulfill this requirement. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we describe the model. In section 3 we analyze 
the incentives to form a free trade agreement. We discuss our empirical strategy in section 4. The 
data are described in Section 5. We show our empirical results in section 6. We conclude in section 7. 
 
2. THE MODEL 
2.A. The economic structure 
We consider a 3-country, N-sector competitive economy where in each sector there is a “natural 
importer” country that would import the good from the other two countries under free trade. Goods 
are produced under constant returns to scale. One unit of the numeraire good 0 is produced with 
one unit of labor. All other goods j = 1…N – 1 are produced with labor and a sector-specific factor. 
Thus, whenever good 0 is produced in equilibrium, which we assume to be the case, the wage rate 
equals unity and general equilibrium forces are absorbed by that sector. 
The analysis is conducted from the perspective of a “Home” country. Home’s population 
consists of a continuum of agents with measure one. Each agent is endowed with one unit of labor, 
                                                          
7 They demonstrate, for example, how trade and capital account liberalization reduce equilibrium taxation 
under democracy while also rendering coups more costly through the impact of openness on factor prices. 
8 This contrasts with an alternative (and rather ubiquitous) view in the trade literature that regards FTAs as 
rent-creating devices (e.g. Grossman and Helpman 1995). See Freund and Ornelas (2010) for a discussion of that 
literature. 
9 See for example Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005), O’Rourke and Taylor (2007), Lopez-Cordova and Meissner 
(2008), and Stroup and Zissimos (2012). There is, of course, also a vast literature on the determinants of democracy 
and of its durability. See Barro (1999) for a classic reference for the former and Przeworski et al. (1996) for the latter. 
Gassebner et al. (2012) provide empirical scrutiny of many factors that could affect the survival of democracies. 
10 See Bagwell and Staiger (2002, 2010) for a discussion of this and other roles of trade agreements. 
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whereas specific factors are owned by a negligible fraction of the population. Consumers have 
quasi-linear utility of the form     11 2 2/)(Nj jj0 qAqqU , which generates demand Dj = A – p j 
for good j. 
Home is the natural importer of goods m = 1…M, country Y is the natural importer of a 
subset E of different goods, and country Z is the natural importer of the remaining (N – M – E – 1) 
non-numeraire products. Home’s owners of the specific factor used in sector j earn j(pj), where pj 
denotes the price of good j in Home’s market. In the non-numeraire sectors, the domestic supply of 
each imported good m is Sm(pm) = dmpm and the supply of each exported good x is Sx(px) = dxpx, 
where dx > dm > 0. An analogous specification applies for the supply and demand structures of 
countries Y and Z. Home can use specific import tariffs in each import sector; other policy 
instruments are assumed unavailable. We represent Home’s tariff on imports from country j by tj, j = 
Y, Z. Because all import sectors are identical, we will write prices and tariffs without sector-
identifying superscripts. 
Prices in the three countries are linked by arbitrage conditions. For a generic product 
imported by Home, this condition is 
(1)     p = pY + tY = pZ + tZ, 
provided that tariffs are not prohibitive. Using this arbitrage condition, market-clearing requires 
(2)   D(p) – Sm(p) = Sx(p – tY) – D(p – tY) + Sx(p – tZ) – D(p – tZ). 
Using the expressions for demand and supplies defined above, condition (2) can be rewritten as 
(3)      )(),(ˆ YZYZ ttttp , 
where   3A/(3+dm+2dx) and   (1+dx)/(3+dm+2dx). 
 When Home is not a member of a free trade agreement, it follows GATT’s requirement of 
non-discrimination. When Home is in an FTA, imports from the FTA partner are duty free, but 
imports from the excluded country remain taxed, although the country’s optimal external tariff will 
in general change as a result of the FTA. 
2.B. The political structure 
We consider that any group represented in the government enjoys power because there are rents for 
holding office. The sources of those rents are transfers/bribes, which the private sector offers to 
government officials in exchange for more favorable policies. Thus, the rents are specific to 
incumbency, as in models like Besley and Coate’s (2001). 
Policymakers also care about national welfare. Numerous reasons can explain this concern. 
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For example, the policymaker could represent a large group in the society, which benefits from a 
more prosperous economy. Or maybe policymakers that are good at promoting national welfare 
obtain more public support, which may affect the duration of their office tenure. Since modeling the 
precise way in which policymakers form their preferences is not essential for our analysis, we take 
an agnostic view and simply assume that whoever is in power sets policy considering both its 
welfare consequences and its capacity to attract transfers. 
 Let us define the measures of welfare. Welfare generated in a specific-factor import sector is 
denoted by Wm(t), whereas Wx represents welfare from a specific-factor export sector. The former is 
defined as the sum of consumers’ surplus, tariff revenue and producers’ surplus generated in that 
sector; the latter is defined as the sum of consumers’ and producers’ surplus in the sector. Welfare 
aggregated across all non-numeraire import and export sectors is then WM(t)  MWm(t) and WX   
(N - M - 1)Wx, respectively.11 National welfare, W(t), aggregates welfare across all sectors: 
    1 11 )(1)(1)( N Mx xMm mXM WtWWtWtW . 
The preference of the government is specified as 
(4)    ,),(),( 1
11     N Mx xmMm m GTtGTtG  
with Gx  Wx and  
(4’)    ,)(),( mmmm bTtWTtG   
where Tm denotes the transfer from import-competing sector m to the government, ,
1  Mm mTT and 
b>0 reflects the “rent-seeking bias” of the government, or how susceptible to bribes/transfers its 
policies are. Thus, if for example the government’s rent-seeking bias were very high, it would care 
mainly about rents. Notice that the government sets policy according to (4) regardless of its nature, 
democratic or not. We adopt this assumption not because we believe that both types of governments 
implement identical policies. It is simply that our main results do not depend on this distinction, and 
we have nothing to add to the (extensive) debate on whether democracies or autocracies are more 
rent-seeking.12 We also abstract from domestic political competition. Nevertheless, one can 
reinterpret the government’s payoff as an expected payoff (taking into account the probability of 
                                                          
11 Note that we denote welfare in import-competing sectors as a function of the tariff, but not in export 
sectors. In reality, W x also depends on tariffs, but on those imposed by foreign countries Y and Z. Since those tariffs 
are given from the perspective of the Home government under any trade regime, we employ this more concise 
representation for notational ease. 
12 Grossman and Helpman (1996) provide microfoundations for the weights in equation (4’), but in a model 
of electoral competition, whereas our context is one where a potential autocrat considers taking over the country, not 
through the ballot box but through force. Dixit (2010) provides a nuanced general discussion of rent-seeking behavior 
in democracies and autocracies. 
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being voted out of power). Ultimately, what is essential is that the rents from holding office depend 
on the policies implemented. 
We assume that producers within each industry can overcome free-riding problems in their 
lobbying activities. Because of the symmetry and independence across sectors, we focus on a single 
import-competing sector. The net payoff of producers in such a sector corresponds to the industry’s 
aggregate profits, m(t), subtracted of the transfers it gives to the local government, Tm. 
As in Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare (1998), we model the interaction between government and 
each domestic industry as a Nash bargaining game, where each side obtains half of the total surplus 
from the negotiation process.13 Under the Nash bargaining protocol, the outcome of the bargaining 
process is jointly efficient. Thus, the “political tariff” resulting from this interaction satisfies 
(5)    )]()(max[arg tbtWt mmp  ,  
where the term in brackets represents (up to a constant) the joint payoff of the government and the 
industry in a representative import-competing sector. We concentrate on the case where the solution 
to problem (5) is interior. This corresponds to assuming that b < bmax  (1+dm)(dx–dm)/(1+dx)dm. 
2.C. Equilibrium payoffs 
If the private sector were able to capture the entire surplus from lobbying, it would only need to 
compensate the government for the distortions that tp creates. In this case, the government would 
obtain just its reservation payoff, which is equivalent to how much it could get in the absence of 
lobbying activities, when it could do no better than by setting the tariff in each import sector to 
maximize national welfare, yielding a payoff from each import-competing sector of Wm(tp(b=0)), or 
simply Wm(b=0). This would require a transfer from each lobby of [Wm(b=0) – Wm(b)]/b, where Wm(b) 
≡ Wm(tp(b)). Conversely, if the government could retain the whole surplus from lobbying, producers 
from each import-competing industry m would earn only their reservation payoff of m(b=0) ≡ 
m(tp(b=0)), entailing a transfer of [m(b) – m(b=0)] to the government. Since government and 
domestic industry split the surplus from lobbying, it is easy to see that the equilibrium transfer from 
each industry to the government is Tm = [m(b) – m(b=0)]/2 + [Wm(b=0) – Wm(b)]/2b. Hence, in 
equilibrium the government obtains from each non-numeraire import-competing sector a payoff of 
                                                          
13 One may want to distinguish the bargaining power of the government relative to the domestic industry 
depending on whether it is democratic or autocratic. For example, one may argue that the forces limiting rent-seeking 
behavior are weaker in a dictatorship because autocracies are less accountable, implying a higher bargaining power 
for the government in autocracies. Since this has no bearing on our results, we take the simpler route of assuming 
that government and private sector always split the surplus from lobbying. 
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(6)      )()()()()()()( bWbWbbbbbWbbTbWG mmmmmmmm 021021 . 
 There is a more intuitive way of representing this expression. First, define the “political 
rents” created in the lobbying process in each non-numeraire import-competing sector as 
(7)      )()()()( 00  bbbWbbbWPR mmmmm . 
The expression in the first brackets of (7) is the maximized joint payoff of the government and the 
industry, while the expression in the second brackets is the value of the same function in the absence 
of lobbying. Thus, the difference between them represents the surplus that the lobbying process 
adds to the joint payoff of government and industry. Using expressions (6) and (7) we can see that, 
in equilibrium, the government obtains its reservation payoff in the sector plus its share of the 
political rents: 
(8)     
2
0
m
mm PRbWG  )( . 
Aggregating across all sectors, we can write (4) evaluated at the equilibrium as  
(9)    
2
0 PRWbWTtGG XMp  )(),( , 
where .
1  Mm mPRPR  Hence, the government obtains in equilibrium its reservation utility, 
[WM(b=0) + WX], plus its share of the political rents. This makes clear that the group in power does 
not fully internalize the welfare distortions due to its use of the political tariff. 
 In contrast, if the same political group were out of power, its payoff would be different even 
if the tariff were the same. The reason is that the group does not receive any rents if it is not in a 
position to enact policies. Accordingly, in that case the group would receive none of the available 
office rents, and its equilibrium payoff H would reflect only the general state of the economy: 
(10)    XMp WbWtGH  )(),( 0 . 
Since WM(b=0)  WM(b) and PR  0, it follows directly from (9) and (10) that there are benefits from 
holding office. 
2.D. Coup threat 
We consider a simple 2-period environment. In the first period there is a democratically elected 
government in power. There is however a group of citizens representing a segment of the 
population that is not in the government, which may attempt to take power through force. There is 
an exogenous probability that they will have this opportunity. We are agnostic about the identity of 
the citizens represented by this group; it could be the military as well as part of the country’s 
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capitalists or the upper class, for example. In any case, if a coup is attempted and is successful, the 
authoritarian group takes power in the second period. 
 Naturally, numerous factors affect both the possibility of initiating a coup and its probability 
of success. For example, both tend to be higher the stronger the “support” of the pro-coup citizens 
and the weaker the “resistance” from the segments of the population opposed to the coup. We do 
not model explicitly these probabilities, because quantifying those forces would be remarkably 
difficult. We highlight, however, that they are likely to be strongly affected (negatively) by the 
country’s stock of “democratic capital” (DC). The notion of democratic capital, introduced by 
Persson and Tabellini (2009), proxies the strength of the country’s democratic institutions, and in this 
sense it provides a useful and concise way of capturing several forces highlighted in the voluminous 
literature on the durability of democracies. Specifically, in the definition of Persson and Tabellini 
(2009) the current stock of DC in a country is determined by both the level of democracy in the 
country’s neighbors and by the country’s democratic history. Accordingly, they reason that in 
nations with enduring democratic tradition, where the rule of law is strong, democratic capital will 
be abundant and significantly limit the possibility of political disruption. Conversely, in countries 
lacking solid institutions, where the rule of law is weak, democratic capital will be scarce, thus 
opening a tangible opportunity for successful coups. Since the level of democratic capital in a 
country can be considered exogenous (or at least pre-determined) to the relevant political groups, 
we will rely on it in our empirical analysis. 
Both the democratic government and the authoritarian group discount future payoffs 
according to a common discount factor   [0, 1]. To understand when the authoritarian group will 
attempt to subvert the country’s democratic order, we model the group’s problem as simply as 
possible. In particular, we assume that, if the takeover attempt is successful, the authoritarian group 
imposes an autocratic regime in the country and obtains its office payoff G in the second period. If 
the takeover attempt is unsuccessful, the group bears a fixed cost K > 0.14 
When a coup is attempted, the present value payoffs of the incumbent and of the 
authoritarian group are represented, respectively, as follows: 
(12)    ])[( HGGD  1  , 
(13)    ]))([( GKHHA  1 . 
If no coup were attempted, the incumbent government and the authoritarian group receive, 
                                                          
 14 Parameter K provides a proxy for the many kinds of penalties that could apply in such a case—
incarceration, extradition, death and the like. 
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respectively, G and H in each period. 
The (risk-neutral) authoritarian group attempts to take power if and only if the expected 
utility from the endeavor is positive: A > (1 + )H. Using (13), this condition is equivalent to 
(14)     KHG )()(  1 , 
where denotes the probability of success of the coup. That is, provided that it can initiate a coup, 
the authoritarian group will attempt to take power if its expected gain from seeking power is large 
relative to the expected cost of a failed coup. To make explicit what is behind this decision, we use 
expressions (9) and (10) to rewrite condition (14) as 
(15)      K
DC
DCPRbWbW MM
)(
)(-)(-)( 
 1
2
0 . 
In a consolidated democracy, where democratic capital is very high, an attempt against the county’s 
democratic system is unlikely, unless the costs of failure are too low—which is rarely the case—or 
the gains from holding power are very significant. Our central goal is to analyze how a free trade 
agreement affects the latter, and through that channel the endurance of democracy in a country. 
Naturally, an FTA can be used to affect future policies only if its reversal is costly enough to 
inhibit future governments from reversing the arrangement. While here we simply assume that 
FTAs are irreversible, it would be relatively straightforward to extend the current model so that 
irreversibility becomes an equilibrium result, e.g. by relying on McLaren’s (2002) notion that 
governments incur in “negotiating costs” when forming (or withdrawing from) FTAs. Ultimately, 
FTAs matter for commitment as long as there is a non-trivial cost to reverse them.15 
It is also important to clarify that, although we consider a discrete-time problem, one should 
think of this as a continuous-time problem, where the realization of a coup depends on both 
exogenous (e.g. the state of the world economy) and endogenous (e.g. effort spent on coordination) 
factors. The point we develop below is that the latter is affected by policies such as the formation of 
an FTA. We keep the 2-period modeling only for expositional reasons. 
 
3. THE DECISION TO FORM A FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
A free trade agreement between two countries is represented by the elimination of tariffs on 
each other’s imports in all sectors included in the agreement. Thus, the equilibrium under an FTA is 
                                                          
15 Irreversibility is also coherent with history, as preferential trading arrangements de facto implemented are 
seldom turned down later on. Even in the rather rare circumstances when authoritarian regimes gained control of a 
country that participated in an effective trade agreement, the arrangement is usually honored, as for example in 
Swaziland, a member of SACU. 
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analogous to the one described in Section 2, the only difference being the constraint imposed on 
some (potentially all) of the partners’ reciprocal import tariffs. Without loss of generality, we let 
Home’s potential FTA partner be country Y. 
 An FTA can be implemented by the incumbent government for reasons related or unrelated 
to the authoritarian threat. There are four possibilities. First, the country may already be a 
consolidated democracy, in the sense that condition (15) holds neither with nor without FTAs. This 
is the standard case considered in the regionalism literature, and it is not our goal to analyze it 
further here. Rather, we focus on situations where FTAs can be formed for “strategic” reasons. 
 The second possibility is that the country’s democracy is so fragile that condition (15) is 
satisfied whether or not there is an FTA in place. In that case, while an FTA cannot be used to 
prevent a coup, the possibility of losing power can affect the incentives of the incumbent 
government with respect to the formation of the agreement. Finally, it is possible that an FTA affects 
(in either direction) the expected payoff of the authoritarian group and, as a result, its incentives to 
attempt to take power. 
 Before starting our analysis, we need however to describe the effects of an FTA on the level 
of available political rents and the role of parameter b in shaping its welfare effects. These results set 
the basis for the analysis of the political viability of FTAs. 
3.A. The rent destruction effect 
Ornelas (2005a) shows that an FTA moderates the role of political economy forces in the 
determination of tariffs, and that the mitigation of the politically driven distortions corresponds to a 
source of welfare gain that is more relevant, the more far-reaching the government’s political 
economy motivations. Furthermore, an FTA diminishes the rents created in the lobbying process. 
Intuitively, because the arrangement provides free access to the partner’s exporters, the market share 
of the domestic industry shrinks, at any given external tariff. As a result, the FTA makes any price 
increase brought by a marginal increase in the external tariff less valuable for the import-competing 
industries, lowering their incentives to lobby for higher external tariffs. In equilibrium, these lower 
incentives result in a lower external tariff and in fewer rents for the government.16 The following 
                                                          
16 There is robust empirical evidence that the formation of free trade areas in developing countries (largely 
the focus of our analysis) leads to declining external tariffs (see Estevadeordal et al. 2008 for evidence on ten Latin 
America countries and Calvo-Pardo et al. 2011 for evidence on ten Southeast Asia countries), although the evidence is 
mixed for developed countries (see Limao 2006 and Bernhofen et al. 2012). While measuring protectionist rents 
directly is very difficult, the level of tariffs provides a good proxy for them; see Freund and Ornelas (2010) for a 
general discussion. 
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lemma summarizes these effects.17 
 
Lemma 1. The rent destruction effect of FTAs (Ornelas 2005a) 
Everything else constant, an FTA 
(a) improves Home’s welfare by more (or reduces it by less), the higher the government’s 
rent-seeking bias; and 
(b) reduces the political rents generated in the political process. 
 
Lemma 1 allows us to analyze the conditions under which the Home government would 
choose to form an FTA.18 The decision regarding the formation of an FTA is based on the anticipated 
impact of the agreement. The government implements the agreement if and only if it increases the 
government’s present value payoff. Note that the effects described in Lemma 1 are larger, the 
greater the number of specific-factor import-competing sectors included in the FTA. 
 Before proceeding to analyze how the possibility of political disruption affects the  
government’s willingness to form free trade agreements, let us define some useful notation. We 
henceforth attach subscript “F” to all variables when they are evaluated under an FTA. We adopt 
subscript “F” to represent the equilibrium change in any variable due to the FTA. For example, xFW  
denotes the aggregate welfare change in a non-numeraire export sector due to the agreement, 
whereas )(bW mF  and )( 0 bW mF  denote, respectively, the actual aggregate welfare impact of the 
FTA on a non-numeraire import sector and the equivalent effect under a hypothetical administration 
whose only concern is national welfare (equivalent to a situation where lobbying is effectively 
banned). Finally, let IM denote the number of specific-factor import-competing sectors included in 
the FTA under analysis, with IM ≤ M. Aggregating the welfare impact of the agreement on both 
types of sectors, we then define )()( bWIbW mF
MM
F    and .xFXXF WIW    Analogously, .mFMF PRIPR    
3.B. FTAs that do not affect the probability of political disruption 
We begin analyzing the case where there is a possibility of political disruption but this possibility is 
unaffected by the existence of FTAs—that is, condition (15) holds regardless of FTAs. 
In this case, the equilibrium payoff of the incumbent democratic government under the FTA 
corresponds to 
                                                          
17 These results do not hinge on the perfectly competitive structure adopted by Ornelas (2005a), which we 
follow here. Analogous results obtain also under oligopolistic competition (Ornelas 2005b). 
18 Naturally, an FTA is formed only if all prospective members endorse it. We conduct the discussion from 
the perspective of the Home country, but an analogous analysis would apply for country Y. 
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(16)    ])-[( FFF
D
F HGG  1 . 
The condition under which the democratic government supports the FTA when the authoritarian 
threat is inevitable is 0 DDFDF - . Using equations (12) and (16), DF  can be rewritten as 
    ])[( FFF
D
F HGG   -1 . 
Using expressions (9) and (10) and manipulating, this expression becomes  
(17)           XF
M
F
FM
F
D
F WbW
PRbW  

  )()()()]([ 1
2
0-11 . 
Thus, the incumbent democratic government supports the FTA in this case if 
(18)   01220211   XFMFFMF WbWPRbW )()(])()][-([ . 
 The interesting case is when the democratic government changes its stance toward an FTA 
because of the authoritarian threat. An FTA is (ordinarily) politically feasible if 
(19)    002   FXFMF PRWbW ])([ . 
The next proposition shows that the authoritarian threat can make an otherwise politically infeasible 
FTA (i.e., one for which condition (19) does not hold) into a politically feasible one. 
 
Proposition 1. Even if the authoritarian threat cannot be affected, the mere possibility of political 
disruption can turn an otherwise politically unfeasible FTA into a viable one. By contrast, the 
possibility of disruption cannot render unfeasible an otherwise feasible FTA.  
 
Proof: We need to show first that DF  increases with . Using (19), we have that 
(20)   

 
 


2
-0- FMF
M
F
D
F PRbWbW
d
d )()( . 
We know from Lemma 1 that 0FPR  and that the welfare impact of an FTA is increasing in the 
rent-seeking bias of the government, so that .)()( 00-  bWbW MFMF  Accordingly, expression (20) is 
unambiguously positive, so DF  increases as the probability of disruption rises. As a result, an FTA 
that is politically unfeasible when there is no chance of political disruption can become viable if the 
likelihood of political disruption is high enough. That is, an FTA that does not satisfy condition (19) 
can satisfy criterion (18) for sufficiently high . On the other hand, the reverse cannot happen: if an 
FTA is politically viable when there is no chance of political disruption, it remains viable if a 
possibility of change in power through force arises. That is, an FTA that satisfies condition (19) also 
satisfies criterion (18) for any  > 0.  
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Proposition 1 shows that the possibility of political disruption can enhance the political 
feasibility of FTAs by creating a “strategic” motivation for their adoption. Strategically supported 
FTAs arise when, between conditions (18) and (19), only the former is satisfied, so that 
(21)    )()( 000   DFDF . 
An FTA can be implemented for strategic reasons because the democratic government, if out of 
power, will not receive any of the lobbying-related rents. In that case, the government would benefit 
from an FTA because the agreement constrains the welfare-distorting political activities of the 
authoritarian group if it gets in power. Thus, a government that expects to lose power to a dictatorial 
group might seek an FTA simply to constrain the policies of the incoming authoritarian group. Since 
this strategic motivation is more relevant when disruption is more likely, it follows that “democratic 
instability” incites the formation of free trade agreements. 19 
 The number of Home’s import-competing sectors susceptible to lobbying that are included 
in the FTA, IM, also affects the possibility of strategically supported FTAs. 
 
Proposition 2. The set of parameters under which the possibility of political disruption turns an 
otherwise unviable FTA into a politically viable one increases with the number of Home’s 
specific-factor import-competing sectors included in the agreement (IM). 
 
Proof: To prove this result, it suffices to show that the probability of disruption, , is a strategic 
complement of IM in the function ,DF  which gives the criterion for the political viability of FTAs. 
This function is represented in the left-hand side of (18).  Based on the definition of welfare 
aggregated across all non-numeraire import sectors included in the agreement, we have that 
)].()([)()( 0-0-   bWbWIbWbW mFmFMMFMF  Accordingly, the FTA affects political rents only in the 
included sectors:  mFMF PRIPR   . Therefore, it follows that 
0
2
-0-2
2


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 


m
Fm
F
m
FM
D
F PRbWbW
dId
d )()()( . 
Hence, the set of parameters under which condition (21) is satisfied enlarges as IM increases.  
 
 Thus, the more comprehensive the FTA is, the greater is the extra incentive of the democratic 
                                                          
19 It is easy to see that this strategic motivation for signing FTAs is stronger, the greater the rent-seeking bias 
of the autocrat. This follows because the forces underlined in Lemma 1 are stronger, the higher the rent-seeking bias 
of the group setting policies. This suggests that an authoritarian threat can make strategic FTAs particularly 
appealing, since despite some disagreement, the majority of views in the literature seem to agree that autocracies 
tend to pursue particularly distortionary policies (see Dixit 2010). 
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government to form the agreement because of the authoritarian threat. The reason is that, if Home 
imports more widely from its FTA partner in sectors where there is active lobbying, the agreement 
becomes more rent-destructing. While this is helpful for the country as a whole, it is detrimental to 
those in office who benefit from those rents. Under the threat of political disruption, however, the 
government understands that the loss of rents will be borne instead by the authoritarian group, if it 
is successful in gaining power. The destruction of rents is therefore less critical in the democratic 
government’s evaluation of the agreement. 
3.C. FTAs that can help secure democracies 
The analysis above considers the case where a free trade agreement is not pivotal in the decision of 
the authoritarian group to attempt to take power through force. But this need not be the case. We 
now show that an FTA can change the sign of condition (15). However, the change can go in only 
one direction. Specifically, an FTA can prevent a coup from happening, but it cannot provoke a coup 
that would not occur without the agreement. 
 
Proposition 3. If the authoritarian group did not intend to initiate a coup in the absence of trade 
agreements, an FTA cannot induce it to initiate one. On the other hand, the formation of a 
sufficiently rent-destructing FTA can free the country from the authoritarian threat. This is 
more likely to happen, the greater the number of Home’s specific-factor import-competing 
sectors included in the agreement (IM). 
 
Proof: In the absence of trade agreements, the authoritarian group attempts to take power through a 
coup if condition (15) is satisfied. With an FTA, a similar condition applies: 
(22)     K
DC
DCPRbWbW FMF
M
F )(
)(-)(-)( 
 1
2
0 . 
The difference between conditions (15) and (22) is in the expressions’ left-hand sides, which denote 
the gains of the authoritarian group from getting power. On the other hand, the FTA impacts neither 
the probability of success of a coup nor the costs of a failed coup attempt. Subtracting the left-hand 
side of inequality (15) from the left-hand side of inequality (22), we obtain 
(23)      0
2
0   FMFMF PRbWbW )(-)( , 
where the negative sign follows directly from Lemma 1. Thus, if condition (15) is not satisfied, 
condition (21) will not be satisfied either, implying that an FTA cannot provoke a coup that 
otherwise would not occur. Conversely, condition (15) can be satisfied while condition (21) is not, 
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implying that an FTA can be critical to prevent the authoritarian group from seeking power. Finally, 
note that the left-hand side of (23) decreases with IM: 
  0
2
0
25  
m
Fm
F
m
FM
PRbWbW
dI
lhsd )(-)()]([ . 
Thus, the range of parameters under which an FTA is pivotal in preventing the authoritarian threat 
is larger, the greater the number of non-numeraire import-competing sectors the FTA includes.  
 
Proposition 3 shows that, because of the rent-destructing effects of FTAs, a free trade 
agreement can critically reduce the incentives of the authoritarian group to attempt to subvert the 
country’s democratic system. In this sense, an FTA can help to constrain the emergence of 
authoritarian regimes, especially if the bloc is significantly rent-destructing, as in that case it will be 
more effective in lowering the gains from power of the authoritarian group. Relying on the common 
notion that the availability of rents can entice political turbulence—while the unavailability of rents 
can prevent it—the proposition’s novelty stems from the recognition of free trade agreements as 
instruments to restrain the gains from rent-seeking behavior. 
We still need to ask, however, whether the incumbent democratic government would 
actually want to implement the arrangement. The next proposition shows that the possibility of 
using an FTA to block a coup necessarily raises the government’s incentives to sign an agreement. 
 
Proposition 4. An FTA can become politically feasible by being pivotal to prevent a coup.  
 
Proof: When an FTA cannot prevent the authoritarian group from seeking power through force, it is 
politically viable if .])[( 0-1   FFFDF HGG  When the agreement reverses the decision of 
the authoritarian group, it is adopted by the democratic government if 
])[( HGGGG FF  -1 , 
where the left-hand side represents the present value of the government under the agreement (and 
no authoritarian threat) and the right-hand side corresponds to its expected present value without 
the FTA (and with the authoritarian threat). This condition can be rewritten as 
(24)    0-1   )()( HGG F . 
Now notice that the left-hand side of (24) is greater than DF  if ,FF HG  which is true from the 
definitions of FG  and FH , which are analogous to those in (9) and (10). Hence, even if 
D
F  < 0, 
condition (24) can be satisfied.  
 
 Proposition 1 asserts that the possibility of political disruption can render feasible an 
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otherwise unfeasible free trade agreement. Proposition 4 indicates that the political support for an 
FTA is further enhanced if the agreement can also play a role in preventing disruption of the 
political system. This is true even though here we abstract from any ideological motivation the 
incumbent democratic government may have; if the government perceived a benefit per se from 
maintaining democracy in the country, its incentive to form an FTA that can serve that purpose 
would be further enhanced. 
 It is also worth noting that, although we abstract from direct lobbying for and against FTAs, 
adding ex-ante lobbying would have little effect on the analysis, just as Ornelas (2005a) shows to be 
the case when changes in the political regime are not considered. Consider for example exporting 
sectors, the main source of support for FTAs. Their benefits from an FTA depend primarily on the 
extent of the access to the partners’ markets, rather than on domestic policies. Therefore, their 
willingness to support an FTA is not directly affected by who is in power. 
Our results thus suggest that free trade agreements—especially those that are particularly 
effective in destroying rents—can be useful to prevent an authoritarian threat. This can be especially 
important in fledgling democracies, given the instability that typically follows the end of dictatorial 
regimes. We now turn to showing that these relationships are also empirically robust. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
The model has two main predictions about the relationship between FTAs and democracy, 
which imply the following hypotheses: 
 
H1. Participation in FTAs lowers the probability of democratic failure. 
H2. Unstable democracies are more likely to form FTAs. 
 
To test H1, our dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether democracy was 
interrupted, or alternatively the length of democratic spells. This allows us to estimate the 
probability that democracy will fail in the country, which we denote by Prob(enddemo). We define 
democracy failure in different ways, based alternatively on Polity IV data and on a dichotomous 
classification from Cheibub et al. (2010); we explain this in detail in Section 5. The key independent 
variable is a measure of the intensity of the country’s participation in FTAs. 
To test H2, our dependent variable is the change in a country’s FTA participation. The key 
independent variable is a measure of democratic instability that reflects the expectation that the 
democratic regime may fail in the country. 
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As indicated in the Introduction, our problem is related to the one studied by Persson and 
Tabellini (2009), who examine the determinants (in particular the effect of income) of the stability of 
democracies and the impact of this perceived stability on income growth. Our empirical strategy 
resembles their approach. 
4.A. Testing H1: Participation in FTAs and democracy survival 
We estimate the likelihood of democratic failure relying on the concepts of domestic democratic 
capital (DOM) and foreign democratic capital (FOR) developed by Persson and Tabellini (2009), 
while adding a variable that captures the intensity of a country’s participation in FTAs. DOM is a 
measure of the democratic history of the country, whereas FOR measures current levels of 
democracy in the world.20 Other explanatory variables include economic factors (e.g. GDP per 
capita, denoted by vector X) and geographical and institutional factors (e.g. war indicators, continent 
of location and legal origin, denoted by vector Z).  
The dataset covers only countries’ democratic spells. We estimate a discrete time duration 
analysis modeled as logit, which can be implemented as follows: 
(25)  log(P/(1-P)) = 0 + 1FTAt-1 + 2DOM t-1 + 3FOR t-1 + 4X t-1 + 5Z t-1 + ut, 
where P denotes Prob(enddemo) and subscript t-1 indicates that the variable is lagged one year.21 
 The variable FTA in equation (25) represents the extent (or the “intensity”) of a country’s 
participation in FTAs in a given year. Measuring the FTA intensity of a country is far from trivial. 
Despite a prolific literature on the consequences of preferential trade integration, that line of 
research offers no guidance on how to measure this intensity. In fact, most empirical regionalism 
papers simply use dummies to represent FTA participation. While this may be adequate for other 
purposes, such a measure is inappropriate here for several reasons. First, unlike other studies where 
the unit of observation is a country dyad, we need a measure of FTA participation at the country 
level, since we want to estimate the endurance of democracy in individual countries. And while 
some countries participate in a single (or no) FTA, others are members of multiple agreements. 
Second, there is wide heterogeneity among FTAs. While some arrangements are fully implemented, 
others are not, implying that preferences actually offered are few and small, and therefore entail 
little destruction of rents. Furthermore, some agreements are very large (e.g. the European Union), 
                                                          
20 In the next section we provide a precise definition of both variables. 
21 An alternative to this logit specification would be a complementary loglog (cloglog) regression, where we 
treat the time interval as discrete or grouped by year. However, when the probability of positive outcomes is small as 
in our case, where democratic failures account for only 2.2% of the sample (see Table 1), a cloglog link function is 
similar to a logistic link function. Since logistic regressions are more conventional than cloglog ones, we focus on the 
former. Results from cloglog regressions are similar. 
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while others are tiny, including some that have many members (e.g. CARICOM). Third, even within 
a given FTA, the impact of the bloc can be very different on each member. Consider NAFTA: while 
it has a very large impact on Mexico, the smallest member, its effects are much less pronounced in 
the United States, the largest member. Now, according to Proposition 3, only sufficiently rent-
destructing FTAs have an effect on the sustainability of democracy. We clearly need, therefore, a 
more precise measure of the intensity of a country’s participation in FTAs than what FTA dummies 
can offer. 
In our model, where all sectors are symmetric, the extent of rent destruction within an FTA 
is given by the number of import-competing sectors included in the agreement. More generally, it 
depends also on the size of the export sectors of the FTA members relative to Home’s import-
competing sectors. To capture both, we use in our main regressions the share of imports from FTA 
members. This variable does not indicate whether the imports from the FTA partners are in sectors 
where lobbying takes place, which is where the rent destruction effect of FTAs will be operative. In 
fact, identifying empirically those sectors in every country would be virtually impossible. 
Nevertheless, the variable has the central virtue of varying monotonically with the degree of 
implementation of the agreement and with the importance of the agreement for the country in 
question. Consequently, it should be positively correlated also with the variable IM in our model, 
which represents the extent to which import-competing sectors where lobbying happens are 
included in the agreement. Hence, the import share from FTA members provides a useful proxy for 
the country-level degree of rent destruction engendered by the FTAs a country belongs to,22 and it 
appears to us to be much superior to alternative methods of measuring FTA participation available 
in the literature (almost always dummy variables).  
We also need to take into account the possibility of duration dependence in (25), i.e. the 
extent to which the conditional hazard of democracy rises or falls over time. If there is duration 
dependence, the hazard of enddemo will depend on the duration of the democratic regime. In 
general, its effect can be either positive or negative. Domestic democratic capital will capture part of 
the duration dependence. For the residual duration dependence, we use a polynomial of a time 
counter that counts the number of years passed since the beginning of the current democratic spell. 
The order of the polynomial is determined by the best fit in the regressions.23 Including this duration 
polynomial, which we denote by DUR, we rewrite our estimating equation as 
                                                          
22 We use a country’s import/GDP ratio to control for the overall importance of its import sector. 
23 Using year dummies to account for duration dependence is not an appealing alternative for our analysis, 
since all the years without a democratic failure would be dropped from the sample, causing the loss of important 
cross-sectional variation. 
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(26)  log(P/(1-P)) = 0 + 1FTA t-1 + 2DOM t-1 + 3FOR t-1 + 4X t-1 + 5Z + 6DUR + ut. 
 A remaining concern in (26) is unobserved heterogeneity. It is possible that some countries 
are more likely to have interrupted democracies due to unobserved variables that are correlated 
with some right-hand side variables in (26). To deal with this possibility, we run a country random 
effects logit specification.24 
Alternatively, we also use continuous time duration analysis for equation (26), defining the 
dependent variable as the duration of a democracy spell, i.e. the number of years passed since the 
onset of each democracy spell until it was interrupted or right-censored.25 This variable is the same 
as the time counter we use for the duration dependence in the logit specifications. Hence the unit of 
analysis here is a democratic spell. The duration dependence is specified parametrically (Weibull 
model) or non-parametrically (Cox proportional hazard model). In the Weibull model, the hazard 
function is 1 tXth t )exp()( , where φ is a shape parameter to be estimated and t is the duration 
time. In the Cox model, the hazard is )exp()0()( tXhth  , where the baseline hazard, h(0), is 
allowed to be group-specific. 
4.B. Testing H2: Democracy instability and FTA formation 
Once we have the predicted Prob(enddemo), we can use it to test our second hypothesis, that the 
likelihood of democratic failure helps to explain the formation of FTAs. In the analysis we also 
include the economic, geographical and institutional variables used in the duration regression as 
controls, except DOM, FOR and the duration dependence terms. Nothing in our theory suggests that 
these variables should have an independent effect on the change of a country’s FTA participation, 
FTA, in addition to their indirect effects on FTA through Prob(enddemo). This is analogous to the 
identification assumption of Persson and Tabellini (2009), that democratic capital affects income 
growth through their effects on the sustainability of democracy only. We also exclude the duration 
dependence terms; instead, we use year dummies to capture time effects. In our context, the 
rationale to exclude FOR may not apply, because the level of democracy in a region could have an 
independent effect on the likelihood that countries in the region will form FTAs. Thus, for 
                                                          
24 Acemoglu et al. (2008) highlight the importance of including country fixed effects when studying the 
effect of income on democracy. Unlike in that type of analysis, in our case a fixed effects logit procedure (i.e. 
conditional logit) would be inappropriate because most countries do not experience democracy failure during our 
sample period. As a result, the observations for all long-lived regimes would be dropped, eliminating much of the 
cross-sectional variation in the data that helps us to capture the effect of FTAs on democracy survival.  
25 Since the Polity dataset can go as far back as 1800, we can determine the onset of the democratic spell even 
for most countries that have a democratic regime in the beginning of our sample (1960). In the few instances when 
this is not possible, we set the onset of the democratic spell to the first year for which the polity score is available. 
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robustness we also run a specification where we include in the FTA regression both DOM and 
FOR, as well the duration dependence terms. In that case we rely only on the non-linearity of our 
regression to identify the parameters of interest. In all cases, in line with our model we use import 
shares from FTA partners to measure the intensity of a country’s FTA participation. We also include 
country fixed effects in all regressions.26 
To test H2, we then run the following specification: 
(27) ΔFTA = 0 + 1Prob(enddemo)t-1 + 2FTA t-1  + 3X t-1  + 4Z t-1  + {country and year FEs} + vt. 
In equation (27) we measure Prob(enddemo) with its predicted hazard rate evaluated at FTAt-1=0, 
which we denote by hˆ . We do so to eliminate the effect of FTAs on our measure of political 
instability (we already include FTAt-1 itself in (27)). We also include the squared term of hˆ  to capture 
possible nonlinearities. Since hˆ  is a constructed regressor, we adjust standard errors using 
bootstrapping methods. Our model predicts a positive impact of hˆ  on FTA formation. 
 
5. DATA 
We have a panel with 116 countries that have experienced democracy at some point during 
1960-2007. Not every country is included because our study is restricted to democracies. In the 
Online Appendix (http://personal.lse.ac.uk/ornelas/Liu&Ornelas_Appendices.pdf) we list the 
countries covered in our enddemo duration analysis. More than 200 countries are covered in the 
construction of our FTA measures, as explained below. 
An unavoidable difficulty in any empirical analysis of regional trade agreements is that 
some of them represent little more than scraps of paper. We try to turn this problem to our favor, by 
examining whether our predictions hold similarly for the shallowest arrangements; if the 
mechanism at work is indeed the destruction of rents, it should not. 
One still needs, however, to determine which agreements are those. To make this distinction, 
we follow a simple set of rules. First, we classify as free trade agreements all free trade areas and 
customs unions ratified under GATT’s Article XXIV, which we refer to as full-fledged free trade 
agreements (or FTAs, for brevity). The Article specifies minimum liberalization requirements that 
preferential trade agreements have to satisfy. Developed countries must notify their agreements to 
                                                          
26 Even though much has been written about regionalism, we still know relatively little about what makes 
governments willing to form FTAs. Consider for example the seminal contribution by Baier and Bergstrand (2004). 
Most of the explanatory variables they consider are either geographical, which do not change over time, or 
“structural,” in the sense of changing little over time (e.g. factor endowments). Since we work with a panel, our fixed 
effects capture all of those fixed/almost fixed factors.  
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the WTO under Article XXIV. Trading blocs formed only by developing economies can notify either 
under Article XXIV or under the Enabling Clause, which imposes much fewer constraints on what 
bloc members must accomplish. Accordingly, we consider agreements notified under the Enabling 
Clause—as well as those not notified to the WTO—to be partial-scope preferential trade agreements 
(PTAs, in short). These rules, while sensible, tend to overstate the number of PTAs relative to FTAs, 
because some developing countries may choose to notify the agreement under the Enabling Clause 
(to gain flexibility in their liberalization path) even when they intend to liberalize significantly vis-à-
vis each other. To avoid this bias, we delved into the literature studying specific agreements to 
identify such cases. We identified three agreements—Mercosur, CAN and ASEAN—that are notified 
under the Enabling Clause but have implementation rates comparable to several Article XXIV FTAs. 
We could not find studies providing similar evidence for other Enabling Clause PTAs. Importantly, 
eliminating those exceptions does not have a qualitative important effect on our estimates. 
Data for the agreements come from the WTO website and also from information available in 
several other sources. In the Online Appendix, we list the agreements in our dataset with their types 
(FTAs or PTAs) and other information about the data sources. As discussed in the previous section, 
we proxy a country’s intensity of FTA participation by its imports from FTA partners as a share of 
its total imports in a given year. We use an analogous definition for PTA participation: 
 FTA_impsh: a country’s imports from FTA partners as a share of its total imports; 
 PTA_impsh: a country’s imports from PTA partners as a share of its total imports. 
As shown in Table 1, the average import share from PTAs in our sample is 0.06, compared to 0.21 for 
FTAs. We obtain the import data from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. To construct the shares, 
we carefully consider the dates of the formation of new blocs, of the accession of new members, and 
of the de-activation of existing blocs. 
 As we follow Persson and Tabellini’s (2009) general estimation strategy, our first definition 
of democracy failure follows their definition, which relies on Polity IV data (available at 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm). This entails defining a regime as “democratic” 
iff its polity2 score (which ranges from -10 to 10, with higher values representing more democratic 
regimes) is strictly positive.27 In a democratic spell, enddemo is zero as long as democracy remains 
uninterrupted and becomes unity when it ends. If a democracy does not end during our sample, 
enddemo is right-censored. There are 61 episodes of enddemo in our sample according to this 
definition (see the Online Appendix for the list of episodes). For those transitions, the median score 
                                                          
27 Countries enter the sample as they become independent, but only if they have a strictly positive polity2 
score, since our study is restricted to democracies. 
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before the change is 4.8, whereas the median score after the change is -3.5; the median drop in the 
polity2 score is 8.8 points. A representative example of the median case of democracy failure is 
Thailand from 1970 to 1971, when its polity score fell from 2 to -7. 
 We also use a different measure of democracy failure from a recent database developed by 
Cheibub et al. (2010, available at https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/cheibub/www/DD_page.html).28 Their 
measure has the advantage of offering a dichotomous classification of democracy/autocracy that 
yields a straightforward definition of the transitions—unlike the Polity index, where transition 
needs to be defined according to (necessarily) arbitrary thresholds. There are 44 cases of enddemo in 
our sample according to this definition (see Online Appendix). 
 Following Persson and Tabellini (2009), the construction of DOM and FOR is also based on 
polity2 scores. DOM is defined as 
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where  is a discount factor and di,t- is a dummy for a strictly positive polity2 score. The first 
positive dummy for each country is either the first year with a strictly positive polity2 score or the 
first year the country appears in the Polity dataset, which for some countries goes back to 1800. As 
Persson and Tabellini, we find that what really matters for democratic stability in DOM is current 
DOM (i.e. the current democratic spell), whereas the portion of DOM due to previous democratic 
spells is usually insignificant in the regressions. Accordingly, we use current DOM in all of our 
regressions, so t0 corresponds to the first year in which dit = 1 in the current democratic spell. For the 
discount factor, we adopt  = .95; results change little for   [.94, .99], the range considered by 
Person and Tabellini. In turn, FOR is defined as 
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where Polityjt is country j’s polity2 score at t (rescaled to the [-1,1] interval), Distij is the distance 
between the capitals of countries i and j, DEq is half the length of the equator, and Nt is the number 
of independent countries in the world at t. Thus, the closer a country is to other democracies, the 
greater its own stock of foreign capital. 
 GDP per capita data come from the World Development Indicators database. Data on wars 
come from the Correlates of War dataset and includes all wars a country was involved in. Legal 
origin data are drawn from La Porta et al. (1999). Colonial history variables come from the CIA’s 
                                                          
28 Cheibub et al. (2010) extend the classification proposed initially by Alvarez et al. (1996). 
 
 26
World Fact Book. WTO membership data come from the WTO website. Trade openness measures 
are obtained from the Penn World Table 6.3. The data used to calculate the number of international 
organizations (IO) come from the database for International Governmental Organizations (IGO, 
v2.3).29 The data on formal military leader as chief executive are based on Gandhi and Przeworski 
(2006).30 Table 1 lists the definitions of all the variables used in the main regressions and provides 
descriptive statistics.  
 
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
6.A. Does participation in FTAs affect democracy survival? 
We study first the impact of lagged FTA participation on the duration of democracy. Table 2A 
shows the duration analysis results for five different specifications. The logit regression (1) uses only 
the FTA import share variable as a regressor. This variable alone explains around 7% of the variation 
in enddemo, as shown by the Pseudo R2. In regression (2) we add all control variables and the 
duration dependence terms. It turns out that a second-order polynomial of the time counter 
produces the best fit of the model. In regression (3) we use country random effects, yet the LR test of 
the random effects (“rho”) is insignificant at the 10% level and the changes in the estimated 
coefficients are overall quite small. Standard errors in those regressions are clustered at the country 
level. Columns (4) and (5) show results for the continuous time duration models, where the 
dependent variable measures the number of years passed since the onset of a democratic regime. 
Column (4) shows the coefficient estimates of the Weibull regression, whereas column (5) displays 
the coefficients of the PH Cox model. 
 In all five specifications, the coefficient of the FTA import share is negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% level. This result supports our first hypothesis that greater participation in FTAs 
lowers the probability of democratic failure in a country. As for the control variables, GDP/capita, 
DOM, FOR and UK colony dummy have a negative and statistically significant impact on enddemo, 
while the war dummy has the opposite effect. The estimated coefficients of the other variables are 
statistically insignificant. 
Table 2B reports estimates when we use the Cheibub et al.’s (2010) definition of democratic 
failure. Duration dependence terms are updated accordingly. Results are qualitatively very similar 
to those from Table 2A, although the estimated coefficients are larger. This reinforces the evidence 
                                                          
29 Available at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/IGOs/IGOv2.3.htm. 
30 We thank James Raymond Vreeland for kindly sharing the data with us. 
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that more FTA participation tends to increase the longevity of democracies. 
Are the estimates also economically significant? It is useful to interpret the coefficients in 
terms of marginal effects. Consider the logit regression result in column (2) of Table 2B. The 
corresponding average marginal effect of FTA_impsh is 0.06. It implies that a one standard deviation 
increase in the FTA import share (0.282) would decrease the hazard of enddemo by about 1.7 
percentage points (= 0.282*0.06*100) on average, which is about 67% of the average predicted hazard 
(2.5 p.p.). Compared with the variables Persson and Tabellini (2009) put forward as key 
determinants of democracy survival, this reduction is greater (in absolute terms) than that following 
a one-standard-deviation increase in foreign democratic capital (1.3 p.p.), though smaller than the 
corresponding figure for domestic democratic capital (8 p.p.). Or consider Mongolia, the only 
country without any FTA by 2010. According to the logit estimate, Mongolia’s hazard rate in 2005 
would drop from 4.76% to 2.42% if it had the same FTA import share as Chile (FTA_impsh=0.39 in 
2005), or to just 0.4%, if Mongolia had the same FTA import share as Mexico (FTA_impsh=0.72 in 
2005).  
In Table 2C we show that, when using the polity2 scores to define transition, the precise 
level of the threshold is not critical to our qualitative results. Surely, when defining democracy 
failure by a move in the polity2 score from strictly positive to non-positive, we may capture some 
very minor political changes (say a change in the score from 1 to 0). Of course we also use the binary 
measure from Cheibub et al. (2010), which is not open to this type of criticism, but it is nevertheless 
useful to check whether such marginal changes in democratic status are driving our results with the 
Polity data. In columns (1)-(3), we no longer classify as democracy failure the cases where the polity2 
score drops by less than 6 points in the 3 years following the last year with a strictly positive polity 
score.31 In columns (4)-(6), we follow Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006) and set the threshold for 
democratic status at a higher level, 7, and again we classify as democracy failure only cases where 
there is a non-trivial drop (of at least 4 points) in the polity2 score. With either of these stricter 
definitions of democracy, the coefficient estimates remain statistically significant; they also nearly 
double in size. 
Table 3 shows in turn the results for partial-scope PTAs, using both Polity and Cheibub et 
al.’s definitions of democratic transition. If the mechanism through which trade agreements help 
democracies to consolidate is the destruction of protectionist rents, as proxied by countries’ FTA 
                                                          
31 Because the country random effects component in column (3) of Tables 2A and 2B are not significant, as 
shown by the estimated “rho” and its p-values, we use logit without random effects in Table 2C and some of the 
other robustness checks reported later. 
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shares, then we should detect an effect of FTAs on democracy survival but not of PTAs. Indeed, 
when adding the PTA import share to the regression, its coefficient is always statistically 
indistinguishable from zero (while the coefficient on FTA_impsh hardly changes), confirming that 
partial, incomplete processes of preferential trade liberalization have no meaningful effect on 
democracy survival.32 
It is also possible that FTAs help to sustain democracies not because of their rent destruction 
effects, but because democratic countries demand democracy from their FTA partners. To test for 
this alternative mechanism, we define another FTA import share measure, FTA_impsh_moredemo, 
which is constructed just as FTA_impsh except that it covers only the imports from FTA partners 
with more democratic regimes, according to the polity2 scores. We add that variable to the 
regression to capture the additional effect that FTAs with more democratic countries may have on the 
political regime. If only the pressure from more democratic partners matters for the relationship, the 
coefficient on FTA_impsh_moredemo would be significant but not the coefficient on FTA_impsh. 
Table 4 shows the results. The results again indicate a sizable role of FTAs in sustaining democracy. 
However, there is no distinguishable additional effect from having the FTAs with more democratic 
partners. Thus, pressure from more democratic FTA partners is not a driver of our results. 
Now, a potential problem in our analysis is the reverse causality between FTA participation 
and Prob(enddemo). However, if our second hypothesis is valid (as we confirm to be the case in the 
next subsection), a greater risk of democratic failure would tend to induce more FTA participation. 
Without addressing this endogeneity issue, we find a negative effect of FTAs on enddemo. Had we 
eliminated it, the estimate would tend to be even more negative. In other words, the endogeneity 
problem biases the result against the hypothesis that FTAs reduce the risk of democratic failure. 
But we also address the endogeneity of FTA_impsh in the enddemo regressions formally. 
Although our specifications for the enddemo regression are all nonlinear, we now estimate it using a 
linear probability model (LMP), so that we can apply two-stage least squares (2SLS). Another benefit 
of LMP is that we can use country fixed effects in the enddemo regression without losing 
observations. To run 2SLS, we need instruments for FTA_impsh. Explaining the evolution of FTA 
formation over time is a notoriously difficult task, as most attempts to explain FTA formation rely on 
time invariant or structural country characteristics. We rely instead on a recent line of research that 
explores “contagion” effects: when neighbors of a country engage in FTAs, the country becomes 
more likely to do the same. Egger and Larch (2008) and Baldwin and Jaimovich (2012), using spatial 
                                                          
32 If we run the enddemo regressions with PTA_impsh while dropping FTA_impsh, the estimates for 
PTA_impsh remain very similar—always statistically insignificant. 
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econometric methods in a bilateral data setting, find strong evidence for contagion effects in FTA 
formation. We therefore construct our first instrument based on the contagion effects of FTA 
formation. We use bilateral data to construct the contagion measure at the country level, to fit into 
our country-year panel data analysis. We first calculate FTA_impshit,-j for every country i that 
imports from country j in year t after excluding country i’s own FTA imports from j. Contagionjt of 
country j in year t is then calculated as the weighted average of FTA_impshit,-j. We use different types 
of weights based on GDPit and distanceij, where distanceij is the great circle distance between i and j. 
We also use remoteness as instrument, defined as a country’s distance to the rest of the world (ROW) 
weighted by countries’ GDPs. As some authors (e.g. Baier and Bergstrand 2004) argue, a country’s 
remoteness affects its propensity to engage in FTAs. Our presumption is that both contagion and 
remoteness affect countries’ likelihood of forming FTAs but have no direct effect on the stability of 
their democracies. 
Table 5 shows the results. Country fixed effects are included in all regressions. The first stage 
regression results show that contagion is a strong instrument for FTA_impsh although remoteness is 
not. Together they are strong instruments as showed by the large joint F-statistics, which range from 
14 to 36. An over-identification test cannot reject the null that these instruments are valid. In the 
second stage regressions, lagged FTA_impsh remains significant at either the 1% or the 10% level. 
These results indicate that our finding that FTA participation helps to consolidate democracies is not 
driven by endogenous factors.   
6.B. Are unstable democracies more likely to seek participation in FTAs? 
We now turn to our second hypothesis. We use the predicted hazard rate from the duration analysis 
to estimate how democratic instability affects FTA formation. The hazard is predicted based on the 
first logit regression in Table 3, which includes both FTA and PTA import shares.33 As discussed in 
Section 4, to capture only the portion of the hazard unaffected by trade agreements, we predict the 
hazard after setting FTA and PTA import shares to zero. The Online Appendix displays a histogram 
of the predicted hazard, showing that it is below 15% for most of the observations in our sample.  
 Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 display the regressions with the predicted hazard, where the 
dependent variable is the change in the FTA import share from the previous year (ΔFTA). We also 
include the square of the predicted hazard to allow for possible nonlinear effects, as well as 
                                                          
33 The second-stage FTA regressions do not change in any qualitatively important way when we use the 
specifications in Table 2A. The same is true if we use Cheibub et al.’s (2010) definition for transition to autocracy as 
the dependent variable in the first stage. 
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remoteness and contagion,34 as defined above. Year dummies are included to capture global trends in 
the formation of trade agreements. To control for unobserved heterogeneity across countries, 
country fixed effects are also included in the regression. Since the hazard is predicted from the first 
stage with sampling errors, we use bootstrapping (500 replications) to adjust the standard errors. 
In column (1), the coefficient of the predicted hazard rate is positive and significant at the 5% 
level, while its quadratic term is only marginally significant at the 15% level. This result supports 
our theoretical prediction that unstable democracies tend to form more FTAs than stable 
democracies. We can also quantify the magnitude of the effect. At the mean value of the hazard 
(0.025), a one standard deviation increase in the hazard (0.038) would lead to about 1.3 percentage 
point increase in the FTA import share. Or consider for example the case of Guatemala from 1966 to 
1967, when its hazard shot up to 0.095 from 0.007. According to our estimates, this should lead to an 
increase of 2.3 percentage points in Guatemala’s FTA import share (the actual increase was 2.65 
percentage points). 
In column (2), we repeat the analysis from column (1) but include DOM, FOR and duration 
dependence terms in the second-stage regression. The purpose of doing this is to check if our results 
are sensitive to these exclusion variables. The estimated coefficient of the hazard show little 
sensitivity to those changes.35 
The last two columns of Table 6 report the results from the analogous exercise for the 
formation of partial-scope trade agreements, PTAs. The effect of the hazard in this case is 
statistically indistinguishable from zero. Thus, political instability has no identifiable effect on the 
formation of partial-scope trade agreements. This is consistent with the mechanism we develop, 
where unstable democracies seek to diminish the rents available to those in power by increasing 
participation in FTAs—but not in PTAs. 
6.C. Robustness 
In this section we discuss the robustness of our results along several dimensions. The accompanying 
tables are in the Online Appendix. 
First, we investigate whether our FTA import share variable captures mostly deepening of 
existing FTAs or the formation of new FTAs. Although the interpretation of the results is similar in 
both cases, it is useful to disentangle the two effects to check whether the formation of new FTAs 
                                                          
34 We report the results from the regressions using contagion with weights given by log(GDP/distance). 
Results are similar with the other weights used in the definition of contagion. 
35 We also tried both excluding DOM and the duration dependence terms while keeping FOR in the second 
stage. The results remain virtually unchanged. 
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matters on its own. To do so, we construct an alternative FTA import share measure (FTA_impsh60) 
by replacing current year imports with the imports in 1960, the first year in our sample. This 
measure excludes all variations in our main independent variable except those that come from the 
formation of new FTA links. We find that doing so increases the magnitude of the FTA coefficients 
slightly, relative to their levels in Table 2A. 
Second, we investigate the role of the GATT/WTO in consolidating democracies. The impact 
of FTAs on the availability of rents is not straightforward. Due to potential trade diversion effects, it 
is conceivable that FTAs may lead to the creation of rents, as some authors have argued; the role of 
our model is to show that, once one accounts for the endogeneity of the external tariffs, FTAs 
actually tend to destroy rents. On the other hand, it should be relatively uncontroversial that 
participation in multilateral trade agreements such as the GATT/WTO, if it has any effect on the 
availability of protectionist rents, it must be a negative one. In light of the dynamic part of our 
model, this should then lower the risk of democratic breakdown. 
We therefore add a WTO membership dummy as an additional regressor to our existing 
enddemo regressions. It turns out to be highly insignificant. Most likely this reflects the huge 
heterogeneity among GATT/WTO members. As Subramanian and Wei (2007) argue, there is in 
particular a central difference between the effects of GATT/WTO membership for countries that 
joined after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round (1994) and those that joined before the round, 
because much more stringent criteria have to be met by the acceding members since 1995 than 
during the GATT period. To capture this potential difference, we split the WTO membership 
dummy in two: GATT_pre1995 equals 1 from the year a country joined the GATT as a formal 
member, provided that this happened before 1995, and zero otherwise; WTO_from1995 equals 1 from 
the year a country joined the WTO as a formal member, which is possible only since 1995, and zero 
otherwise. We find that the coefficient on GATT_pre1995 is always highly insignificant, while the 
coefficient on WTO_from1995 is negative and marginally significant at the 15% level. Precise 
estimates cannot be obtained due to the relatively small variation over time of these variables, but 
these results suggest that the WTO (unlike the GATT) probably has a positive effect on the 
consolidation of democracy in its new members. The inclusion of the two new variables 
notwithstanding, the effect of FTA_impsh is hardly changed.  
Third, motivated by the findings of Pevehouse (2005) that participation in international 
organizations, broadly defined, can help democracies to endure, we also test whether the effects we 
find for FTAs are not capturing the effect of engagement in international organizations (IOs) more 
generally. This would matter, as the reasoning for the latter relies on signaling effects, whereas our 
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emphasis is on a commitment to destroy protectionist rents. Fourth, Cheibub (2006) shows that 
having a former military leader as the chief executive has a negative effect on democracy survival. 
This is confirmed by the extreme bound analysis in Gassebner et al. (2012). Thus we include the 
lagged number of IOs a country belongs to and a dummy variable indicating whether the executive 
leader is a former military officer. The estimated coefficient for formal military leader in the country 
is always statistically indistinguishable from zero. The coefficient on the IO variable is negative and 
significant in some specifications, indicating that engagement in IOs in general help democracies to 
endure. Nevertheless, introducing that variable has virtually no effect on our estimates of how FTA 
participation affects democracy survival.  
Fifth, it is possible that our results are driven by a small number of observations for which 
alternative mechanisms may generate the same statistical association. For example, many previously 
socialist countries both established democratic regimes and entered in FTAs during the 1990s, but 
also went through many other economic and institutional changes. Are those countries alone 
responsible for our statistically significant coefficients? We check that by dropping all previously 
socialist states from our regressions. We find that the magnitude of the estimated coefficient on our 
FTA variable is actually somewhat higher in the restricted sample. This probably reflects the fact 
that some socialist countries that became democracies later reverted to autocracies, despite effective 
participation in FTAs (e.g. Azerbaijan). 
A related concern is that some trade agreements contain rules specifying that members must 
be democratic. This was a pre-condition for accession of the Central and Eastern European countries 
to the European Union. Mercosur added a similar clause for all of its members in 1998. For those 
countries, democracy and FTA participation must therefore be linked and this may have an 
important effect on our estimations. Again, we find that the results are very similar to those from 
Table 2A when we drop the observations to which such rules apply (i.e. Central and Eastern 
European countries once they entered the European Union and all Mercosur members since 1998). 
Our democracy consolidation result could arise also because less rent-seeking democracies 
may be more likely to sign FTAs and may also last longer, relative to more rent-seeking 
democracies. This would imply that the results were driven by omission of a measure on how rent-
seeking a country is. A measure for this variable is generally very hard to find, but Gawande et al. 
(2009) provide estimates for how much governments care about general welfare relative to special 
interests for 54 countries/regions. Although the subset of countries is small relative to our sample, it 
provides a useful proxy. Including such a measure (1/b) in our enddemo regressions, we find that 
this variable is always highly insignificant, whereas the FTA_impsh variable remains significant in 
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all regressions despite the sharp reduction in our sample. 
Another possible omitted variable that may be correlated with our measure of FTA intensity 
is the country’s relative abundance of national resources. Ownership of natural resources in 
resource-rich countries tend to be concentrated in the hands of cohesive and politically strong 
oligarchs who benefit from international trade (and possibly also from participation in FTAs). But 
abundance in natural resources is also associated with higher rents and thus with the breakdown of 
democratic regimes (see e.g. Wantchekon 2002). This suggests a potentially positive bias in our 
enddemo regression, so not including a measure of resource abundance may artificially dampen our 
estimates. We confirm this presumption when we add, in turn, a measure of resource abundance 
constructed by Albornoz et al. (2012) and the share of ores and metal in a country’s exports. 
We also perform a number of robustness checks in our structural regressions.36 First, does 
the hazard of democratic failure actually predict the formation of new FTAs, or just the deepening of 
existing FTAs? To eliminate variation in the dependent variable that is unrelated to the formation of 
new FTA/PTA links, we repeat the regressions in Table 6 using the measure of FTA and PTA 
participation that considers 1960 import shares instead of lagged ones. The estimated coefficient on 
the hazard falls but remains statistically significant at the 1% or the 5% level, confirming that 
democratic instability indeed helps to predict the formation of new FTAs (but not of new PTAs), as a 
more direct interpretation of our model suggests. 
Second, is it really the expectation of regime change (proxied by the predicted hazard) that 
induces more FTAs? One alternative is that a recent change in regime, from autocracy to democracy, 
is what causes more FTAs. Another is that volatility in the degree of democracy has an effect on its 
own. Our estimated hazard may be correlated with both recent changes in political regime and the 
volatility of democracy. To test whether it is indeed the expectation of regime change that matters, 
we include in the ΔFTA regression, in addition to the predicted hazard, one of the following 
variables: (1) reg_change, a dummy indicating whether a country’s polity2 increased from a non-
positive to a strictly positive score, lagged by one year; and (2) var(Polity)_10yr, the variance of 
polity2 scores during the last 10 years, which is used to capture recent regime instability. The first 
newly added variable is statistically significant but not the second. Most importantly, the estimated 
coefficient on the hazard remains positive and statistically significant. These results corroborate the 
idea that the expectation of a possible of democratic disruption matters for FTA formation. 
Third, it is conceivable that our empirical results may be identifying a more general 
                                                          
36 Because the squared term of the predicted hazard is insignificant at the 10% level in our main regressions 
(Table 6), we include only the level of the hazard in our robustness checks. 
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phenomenon than the model suggests. For example, governments may form more FTAs as a 
consequence of general political competition within an electoral system, and not specifically because 
of the threat from autocrats. If the risk of democratic collapse is positively associated with more 
political competition within a democracy, our finding that the threat of the democratic system 
induces FTA formation may be driven by regular political competition within a democracy. To test 
for that, we include a measure of political competition in the ΔFTA regression. We use the variable 
POLCOMP from Polity IV, which codes the degree of political competition in the country.37 Again, 
the newly added variable is statistically insignificant, while the predicted hazard remains 
statistically significant. This suggests that regular political competition in a country is not an 
important driver of FTA formation, unlike the expectation of democratic disruption. 
Finally, negotiating and implementing an FTA is a process that can take several years. This 
suggests that the relationship may be stronger if we use longer lags for the explanatory variables 
and longer differences for FTA. We do that by running the 5-year difference in FTA_impsh on the 
same explanatory variables lagged by 5 years. Alternatively, we calculate first the 5-year moving 
averages of the variables, before taking their 5-year lags or 5-year differences. Please refer to the 
notes in the appendix table for more details. When we take this longer time perspective, the 
estimated coefficient of the hazard remains significant and becomes considerably larger, as expected. 
Put together, these robustness checks boost confidence that we are capturing our intended 
mechanism, rather than the workings of some omitted variable that affects both FTA formation and 
political regimes in general. 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
We study the relationship between a country’s participation in free trade agreements and the 
sustainability of its democracy. We develop a model centered on the destruction of rents caused by 
FTAs. The model delivers two main results. First, deeper engagement in FTAs increases the 
longevity of democracies. Second, political instability promotes FTA participation. 
Relying on the concept of democratic capital developed by Persson and Tabellini (2009) to 
estimate countries’ hazards out of democracy, we test and confirm our two main predictions in a 
sample of 116 countries over almost 50 years. Our results suggest that the rent destruction forces of 
                                                          
37 This variable measures both the regulation of participation and the competitiveness in the political 
process. According to the Polity IV Dataset User’s Manual, POLCOMP reaches its maximum score when “relatively 
stable and enduring political groups regularly compete for political influence and positions with little use of coercion; 
ruling groups and coalitions regularly, voluntarily transfer central power to competing groups; and no significant 
groups, issues, or types of conventional political action are regularly excluded from the political process.” 
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FTAs constitute an important channel through which our predictions manifest. Our measure of FTA 
intensity is aimed at capturing those forces. Moreover, the predictions hold for “proper,” GATT 
1947-compatible free trade areas and customs unions, but not for partial-scope agreements based on 
GATT’s Enabling Clause. We also find that the impact of FTAs on democracy survival is not greater 
when the partners are more democratic, so it is not simply that some countries demand democracy 
from their FTA partners. It is not that general political competition induces FTA formation either; it 
is the uncertainty related to the possibility of major changes in the political regime that matters. 
While all this is “good news” for democratic countries involved in FTAs, we must emphasize 
that participation in FTAs is, unsurprisingly, no panacea: they can help to consolidate democracies, 
but their reach is limited. Our estimates make this limit clear. The effect is nevertheless comparable 
to that of some of the main forces highlighted in the literature, such as the spread and strength of 
democracies in neighboring countries. Similarly, although we have found that democratic instability 
compels governments to engage in FTAs, there are as well many reasons other than democratic 
instability that also foster participation in FTAs. 
Our study pushes forward a small but growing literature (largely in political science) that 
seeks to uncover links between democracy and FTA participation. We depart from it by focusing on 
a specific mechanism—the destruction of rents in FTAs—that allows us to be more precise about the 
relationship. The paper also provides a clear departure from the perspective often taken by 
economists studying regionalism, who tend to focus on the strictly economic aspects of its causes 
and consequences.38 Purely economic motives certainly help, but cannot fully explain the intensity of 
the ongoing outbreak of free trade agreements, which have become the main trade policy instrument 
in many countries.39 We show that the instability of democracies is another important contributing 
factor to this trend. Yet much remains to be known about the interplay between trade agreements 
and democracy. We look forward to future research to further illuminate this relationship. 
 
 
 
                                                          
38 A notable exception is the recent study by Martin, Mayer and Thoenig (2012), who use the frequency of 
wars between two countries in the distant past to test whether FTAs lower the probability of war between them. 
They find that they do, especially when the trade gains associated with the FTA are high, indicating an interesting 
complementarity effect between trade and security gains from FTAs. 
39 A figure in the Online Appendix illustrates this trend. Indisputably, the number of free trade agreements 
in force has accelerated dramatically since the early 1990s. In the same figure we also show the cumulative number of 
transitions to democracy and transitions to autocracy throughout the world since 1948. The former trend has also 
intensified since the 1990s, but the opposite has happened with the latter, in line with what our results suggest. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of main variables  
 
Variable Description Mean S.D. Min Max 
enddemo Dummy indicating the end of a democracy 0.022 0.145 0 1 
L.FTA_impsh Lagged import share from FTA partners 0.214 0.282 0 0.920 
L.PTA_impsh Lagged import share from PTA partners 0.063 0.128 0 0.698 
ΔFTA_impsh Change in FTA_impsh from previous year 0.010 0.067 -0.451 0.761 
ΔPTA_impsh Change in PTA_impsh from previous year 0.002 0.032 -0.442 0.502 
L. log(GDP/capita) Lagged log(GDP/capita) 8.004 1.522 4.400 10.632 
L.DOM Lagged current domestic democratic capital 0.573 0.344 0 1.000 
L.FOR Lagged foreign democratic capital 0.041 0.140 -0.217 0.261 
war Current war indicator 0.063 0.243 0 1 
L.war Lagged war indicator 0.066 0.249 0 1 
socialist leg_origin = Socialism 0.109 0.312 0 1 
africa Africa dummy 0.169 0.375 0 1 
middleeast Middle East region dummy 0.032 0.176 0 1 
Spain_colony UK colony dummy 0.189 0.391 0 1 
UK_colony Spain colony dummy 0.307 0.461 0 1 
L.(M/GDP) Lagged import/GDP 0.358 0.197 0.036 1.528 
duration Duration of democracy (# of years passed) 37.955 43.882 1 208 
Hazard Predicted hazard 0.025 0.038 0 0.386 
enddemo06 enddemo with stricter thresholds 0.011 0.102 0 1 
enddemo64 enddemo with stricter thresholds 0.018 0.132 0 1 
L.FTA_impsh_moredemo FTA_impsh with more democratic partners 0.056 0.165 0 0.899 
Note: The descriptive statistics of most of the variables in this table are based on the sample with 2,827 observations 
used in regressions (2) to (5) in Table 2A, except for the last three variables which are based on regressions (1) and (3) 
in Table 2C and the second regression in Table 4, respectively. 
 
Table 2A: Enddemo regression results using Polity data, FTAs 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 logit logit xtlogit Weibull PH Cox 
L.FTA_impsh -5.907*** -3.027** -3.131** -3.410** -2.938** 
 (1.864) (1.335) (1.427) (1.381) (1.317) 
L.log(GDP/capita)  -0.558*** -0.628*** -0.741*** -0.569*** 
  (0.150) (0.239) (0.153) (0.149) 
L.DOM  -11.935** -11.783 -17.830*** -71.748 
  (5.583) (8.839) (4.642) (0.000) 
L.FOR  -4.723*** -5.116*** -5.951*** -5.028*** 
  (1.569) (1.730) (1.607) (1.535) 
war  1.285* 1.297** 1.258* 0.972* 
  (0.708) (0.643) (0.672) (0.545) 
L.war  -0.290 -0.323 -0.677 -0.292 
  (0.689) (0.681) (0.701) (0.602) 
Socialist  0.256 0.395 0.270 0.201 
  (0.587) (0.707) (0.621) (0.583) 
africa  0.395 0.456 0.050 0.270 
  (0.406) (0.466) (0.359) (0.361) 
middleeast  0.255 0.347 0.978 0.444 
  (1.190) (1.179) (0.895) (1.049) 
Spain_colony  -0.485 -0.470 -0.450 -0.451 
  (0.486) (0.490) (0.471) (0.449) 
UK_colony  -1.216** -1.301** -1.233*** -1.229*** 
  (0.477) (0.507) (0.426) (0.406) 
L.(M/GDP)  -0.032 -0.032 0.083 0.095 
  (1.042) (0.890) (0.981) (0.914) 
Duration  0.613** 0.631   
  (0.260) (0.411)   
Duration^2  -0.009** -0.010*   
  (0.004) (0.006)   
Country RE   Yes   
rho   0.060   
Test rho=0 (p-value)   [0.323]   
Pseudo R2 0.070 0.211   0.111 
Log Lik -309.2 -232.2 -232.1 -97.15 -235.4 
Observations 3,008 2,827 2,827 2,827 2,827 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country in logit regressions.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2B: Enddemo regression results using Cheibub et al.’s (2010) democracy data, FTAs 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 logit logit xtlogit Weibull PH Cox 
L.FTA_impsh -8.144*** -4.963** -5.262* -4.912*** -3.986** 
 (2.265) (1.930) (3.164) (1.804) (1.890) 
L.log(GDP/capita)  -0.400* -0.441* -0.666*** -0.548*** 
  (0.209) (0.229) (0.223) (0.196) 
L.DOM  -2.040 -2.197 -3.374*** -1.437 
  (1.292) (1.506) (1.137) (1.352) 
L.FOR  -5.566*** -5.800*** -7.117*** -6.184*** 
  (1.688) (1.908) (2.008) (1.996) 
war  0.772 0.744 1.069 1.387** 
  (1.062) (0.816) (0.669) (0.646) 
L.war  -0.652 -0.622 -1.138* -1.426** 
  (1.041) (0.872) (0.649) (0.659) 
Socialist   -18.161 -15.061*** -44.731 
   (8,057) (0.875) (0.000) 
africa  1.334** 1.414** 1.555** 1.053* 
  (0.654) (0.633) (0.687) (0.567) 
middleeast   -18.281 -13.799*** -43.373 
   (16,401) (1.341) (0.000) 
Spain_colony  0.741 0.764 0.919 0.393 
  (0.531) (0.492) (0.596) (0.534) 
UK_colony  -0.833 -0.938 -1.134** -0.965* 
  (0.517) (0.585) (0.557) (0.539) 
L.(M/GDP)  -0.557 -0.572 0.418 0.053 
  (1.491) (1.279) (1.136) (1.126) 
Duration  0.132** 0.157*   
  (0.062) (0.092)   
Duration^2  -0.003** -0.003*   
  (0.001) (0.002)   
Country RE   Yes   
rho   0.073   
Test rho=0 (p-value)   [0.255]   
Pseudo R2 0.085 0.211   0.193 
Log Lik -248.1 -168.9 -168.8 -63.48 -116.0 
Observations 3,279 2,122 2,484 2,396 2,396 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country in logit regressions.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2C:  Robustness checks, enddemo regressions with stricter thresholds 
 
 Enddemo06  Enddemo64 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 logit Weibull PH Cox  logit Weibull PH Cox 
L.FTA_impsh -6.261** -6.332** -6.188**  -5.408** -5.897*** -5.779*** 
 (3.007) (3.102) (2.846)  (2.176) (2.155) (2.019) 
L.log(GDP/capita) -0.624** -0.796*** -0.708***  -0.610** -0.923*** -0.708*** 
 (0.255) (0.204) (0.234)  (0.247) (0.296) (0.266) 
L.DOM -3.133 -11.469** -6.391*  -5.618 -18.986* -4.063 
 (4.177) (4.599) (3.591)  (6.142) (11.031) (5.836) 
L.FOR -2.394 -4.050 -2.861  -1.181 -2.661 -1.790 
 (3.001) (2.875) (2.666)  (3.116) (3.147) (3.069) 
war 1.419* 1.304* 1.831**  0.954 0.780 0.340 
 (0.747) (0.788) (0.833)  (0.851) (0.972) (1.279) 
L.war -0.809 -0.822 -0.864  0.948 0.662 1.955 
 (1.301) (1.018) (0.910)  (0.948) (0.841) (1.345) 
socialist -1.140 -1.029 -1.238  -0.983 -0.735 -1.047 
 (1.217) (1.341) (1.199)  (0.939) (0.943) (0.989) 
africa -0.280 -0.554 -0.629  -0.536 -0.703 -0.748 
 (0.739) (0.727) (0.691)  (0.652) (0.597) (0.611) 
middleeast  -13.573*** -43.489   -14.263*** -44.358 
  (1.072) (0.000)   (1.108) (0.000) 
Spain_colony -1.985** -2.092** -2.177**  -2.861*** -2.628*** -3.266*** 
 (0.878) (0.886) (0.870)  (0.867) (0.999) (1.050) 
UK_colony -1.068 -1.335 -1.188  -1.100 -1.488* -1.223 
 (0.871) (0.853) (0.798)  (0.759) (0.777) (0.808) 
L.(M/GDP) 0.812 0.125 0.858  0.983 1.575 1.290 
 (1.703) (2.049) (1.930)  (1.434) (1.311) (1.357) 
Duration 0.133    0.389   
 (0.201)    (0.258)   
Duration^2 -0.003    -0.009*   
 (0.003)    (0.005)   
Pseudo R2 0.259  0.237  0.288  0.254 
Log Lik -69.00 -36.56 -49.22  -82.90 -33.90 -58.44 
Observations 1,986 2,063 2,063  1,986 2,060 2,060 
 
Notes: Regressions (1)-(3) consider only the cases of enddemo where the polity2 score transits from strictly positive to 
non-positive and drops by at least 6 points within a 3-year window since the transition. Regressions (4)-(6) consider 
only the cases of enddemo where the polity2 score transits from 7 or higher to 6 or lower and drops by at least 4 
points within a 3-year window since the transition. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country in 
logit regressions. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Enddemo regression results, partial-scope PTAs 
 
 Enddemo based on Polity   “tta” based on Cheibub et al. 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 logit Weibull PH Cox  logit Weibull PH Cox 
L.FTA_impsh -2.996** -3.418** -2.929**  -5.159** -4.801*** -3.763** 
 (1.327) (1.384) (1.315)  (2.041) (1.770) (1.847) 
L.PTA_impsh 0.344 -0.199 0.121  -1.023 1.055 1.303 
 (1.451) (1.373) (1.304)  (1.649) (1.799) (1.539) 
L.log(GDP/capita) -0.557*** -0.743*** -0.567***  -0.402* -0.666*** -0.558*** 
 (0.151) (0.157) (0.148)  (0.210) (0.224) (0.196) 
L.DOM -12.089** -17.857*** -71.139  -2.066 -3.304*** -1.396 
 (5.779) (4.694) (0.000)  (1.334) (1.163) (1.330) 
L.FOR -4.905*** -5.852*** -5.087***  -4.898*** -7.882*** -7.233*** 
 (1.512) (1.586) (1.536)  (1.764) (2.020) (2.049) 
war 1.297* 1.250* 0.975*  0.755 1.085 1.409** 
 (0.717) (0.673) (0.550)  (1.050) (0.681) (0.683) 
L.war -0.294 -0.674 -0.292  -0.645 -1.159* -1.465** 
 (0.692) (0.697) (0.603)  (1.033) (0.651) (0.682) 
socialist 0.296 0.243 0.215   -13.479*** -37.490*** 
 (0.576) (0.647) (0.604)   (0.895) (0.764) 
africa 0.411 0.040 0.277  1.279** 1.601** 1.134** 
 (0.394) (0.367) (0.365)  (0.634) (0.682) (0.571) 
middleeast 0.194 1.024 0.421   -12.589*** -37.624*** 
 (1.315) (0.979) (1.126)   (1.394) (1.345) 
Spain_colony -0.496 -0.445 -0.455  0.738 0.945 0.445 
 (0.501) (0.476) (0.458)  (0.534) (0.593) (0.530) 
UK_colony -1.227*** -1.227*** -1.232***  -0.811 -1.160** -1.023** 
 (0.465) (0.421) (0.403)  (0.509) (0.545) (0.509) 
L.(M/GDP) -0.003 0.066 0.106  -0.685 0.549 0.230 
 (1.085) (1.000) (0.938)  (1.585) (1.212) (1.191) 
Duration 0.619**    0.133**   
 (0.268)    (0.064)   
Duration^2 -0.009**    -0.003**   
 (0.004)    (0.001)   
Pseudo R2 0.211  0.111  0.212  0.195 
Log Lik -232.2 -97.14 -235.4  -168.7 -63.29 -115.7 
Observations 2,827 2,827 2,827  2,122 2,396 2,396 
 
Notes: The dependent variable in regressions (1)-(3) is the enddemo measure based on the polity2 scores. The 
dependent variable in regressions (4)-(6) is the transition to autocracy (“tta”) measure from Cheibub et al. (2010). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country in logit regressions.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Enddemo regression results, more democratic FTAs vs. less democratic FTAs 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 logit logit xtlogit Weibull PH Cox 
L.FTA_impsh -7.803** -3.872** -4.013* -4.695** -3.785** 
 (3.093) (1.918) (2.167) (2.038) (1.870) 
L.FTA_impsh_moredemo 3.901 1.696 1.779 2.748 1.739 
 (2.545) (1.909) (2.778) (1.987) (1.883) 
L.log(GDP/capita)  -0.564*** -0.627*** -0.748*** -0.575*** 
  (0.152) (0.240) (0.157) (0.151) 
L.DOM  -12.023** -11.877 -17.848*** -67.421 
  (5.606) (8.867) (4.623) (0.000) 
L.FOR  -4.802*** -5.144*** -6.122*** -5.106*** 
  (1.587) (1.723) (1.650) (1.550) 
L.war  1.282* 1.293** 1.261* 0.965* 
  (0.706) (0.641) (0.680) (0.545) 
socialist  -0.286 -0.314 -0.670 -0.285 
  (0.686) (0.679) (0.706) (0.601) 
africa  0.227 0.350 0.217 0.165 
  (0.585) (0.707) (0.622) (0.584) 
middleeast  0.379 0.433 0.044 0.254 
  (0.404) (0.460) (0.356) (0.359) 
socialist_trans  0.244 0.328 0.973 0.437 
  (1.194) (1.175) (0.913) (1.054) 
Spain_colony  -0.489 -0.476 -0.460 -0.452 
  (0.487) (0.486) (0.473) (0.451) 
UK_colony  -1.228*** -1.306** -1.279*** -1.238*** 
  (0.475) (0.507) (0.436) (0.405) 
L.(M/GDP)  0.023 0.017 0.151 0.155 
  (1.030) (0.885) (0.967) (0.905) 
Duration  0.617** 0.633   
  (0.261) (0.412)   
Duration^2  -0.009** -0.010*   
  (0.004) (0.006)   
Country RE   Yes   
rho   0.053   
Test rho=0 (p-value)   [0.342]   
Pseudo R2 0.073 0.212   0.112 
Log Lik -307.6 -231.9 -231.8 -96.50 -235.0 
Observations 2,989 2,823 2,823 2,823 2,823 
 
Notes: L.FTA_impsh_moredemo covers only the FTA partners with more democratic regimes based on Polity scores. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country in logit regressions.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Endogeneity of FTA_impsh in enddemo regressions, 2SLS  
 
 IV = Contagion 
weighted by 1/log(dist) 
 IV = Contagion weighted 
by log(GDP)/log(dist) 
 IV = Contagion 
weighted by GDP/dist 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 1st stage 
L.FTA_impsh 
2nd stage 
enddemo 
 1st stage 
L.FTA_impsh 
2nd stage 
enddemo 
 1st stage 
L.FTA_impsh 
2nd stage 
enddemo 
L.FTA_impsh  -0.187*   -0.349*   -0.729*** 
  (0.113)   (0.203)   (0.247) 
llgdppc 0.014 -0.059***  0.025 -0.053**  0.021 -0.038 
 (0.039) (0.022)  (0.041) (0.024)  (0.038) (0.026) 
lDOM 0.093 0.076*  0.110 0.100**  0.144 0.157*** 
 (0.120) (0.041)  (0.122) (0.051)  (0.113) (0.059) 
lFOR 0.064 -0.170***  0.227 -0.108  0.232 0.040 
 (0.140) (0.056)  (0.138) (0.079)  (0.159) (0.086) 
war 0.026 0.035  0.026 0.039  0.025 0.047* 
 (0.020) (0.027)  (0.020) (0.027)  (0.020) (0.028) 
lwar 0.002 -0.018  -0.000 -0.018  -0.003 -0.020 
 (0.014) (0.023)  (0.014) (0.023)  (0.015) (0.025) 
L.(M/GDP) 0.080 -0.041  0.102 -0.019  0.094 0.031 
 (0.080) (0.044)  (0.084) (0.051)  (0.085) (0.058) 
Duration -0.000 0.004***  0.000 0.004***  -0.001 0.004*** 
 (0.003) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.001) 
Duration^2 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Remoteness 0.461   0.357   -0.109  
 (2.301)   (2.337)   (2.260)  
L.contagion_ldist 63.304***        
 (17.679)        
L.contagion_lgdpldist    0.376**     
    (0.166)     
L.contagion_gdpdist       0.372**  
       (0.178)  
Country FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Partial R2 0.016   0.011   0.031  
F-Statistics for IV 20.47   14.25   36.18  
Over-Identification 
Test (p-value) 
 
0.556 
   
0.530 
   
0.524 
 
R-squared 0.363   0.350   0.353  
Observations 2,827 2,825  2,827 2,825  2,827 2,825 
 
Notes: We use the variables contagion and remoteness as instruments for FTA_impsh. Remoteness is measured as a 
country’s distance to the rest of the world (ROW) weighted by countries’ GDP. In regressions (1)-(2), contagion is 
defined as the average FTA_impsh of all other countries (ROW) weighted by 1/log(distance) to the country in 
question, after we exclude this country’s own FTA exports to ROW. In regressions (3)-(4), we proceed analogously 
but use log(GDP)/log(distance) as the weights in contagion. In regressions (5)-(6), we use GDP/distance as weights. 
Contagion variables are lagged by one year. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Structural ΔFTA and ΔPTA regression results 
 
 ΔFTA_impsh  ΔPTA_impsh 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Hazard 0.337** 0.383***  -0.143 -0.107 
 (0.152) (0.160)  (0.091) (0.105) 
Hazard^2 -0.766 -0.853  0.129 0.019 
 (0.534) (0.543)  (0.317) (0.309) 
L.FTA_impsh -0.132*** -0.139***    
 (0.018) (0.020)    
L.PTA_impsh    -0.103*** -0.111*** 
    (0.021) (0.024) 
L.log(GDP/capita) 0.005 0.004  -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.008) (0.008)  (0.005) (0.005) 
L.DOM  0.008   -0.009 
  (0.022)   (0.010) 
L.FOR  0.179***   -0.032 
  (0.071)   (0.034) 
war -0.010 -0.011*  0.012*** 0.011*** 
 (0.008) (0.008)  (0.005) (0.005) 
L.war 0.001 0.001  -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.006) (0.006)  (0.004) (0.004) 
L.(M/GDP) 0.000 0.006  0.008 0.007 
 (0.020) (0.019)  (0.010) (0.009) 
Duration  -0.000   0.000 
  (0.001)   (0.000) 
Duration^2  0.000   -0.000* 
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
remoteness -0.334 -0.789*  -0.075 0.047 
 (0.455) (0.475)  (0.255) (0.290) 
L.contagion_lgdpldist 1.046 0.575  -0.611** -0.548** 
 (0.740) (0.689)  (0.253) (0.262) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Within R-squared 0.118 0.121  0.098 0.101 
Observations 2,826 2,826  2,826 2,826 
 
Notes: Hazard is the predicted hazard based on the first enddemo logit regression in Table 3, after we set 
L.FTA_impsh = L.PTA_impsh = 0. Standard errors in the second stage are corrected by bootstrapping (500 
replications).  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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